Arguing that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation, recent research questions the assumption that religious diversity leads to more fragmented party systems and finds a negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of vote shares. Before this revisionist perspective can be believed, however, we need to observe the causal processes linking religious diversity and party system fragmentation. One of these is that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections. Using data counting the number of religious parties in elections around the world between 2011 and 2016, the analysis shows that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties. In line with the revisionist perspective, these results suggest that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation that lead elites to cooperate across religious group lines in support of parties representing their shared political interests.
1
Most research examining the impact of social cleavages on the development of party systems assumes that higher levels of social diversity lead to the development of more parties and greater fragmentation of votes across these parties. Drawing on the seminal conclusion from Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that the number of parties is determined by the number of cleavages, most research assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that greater levels of diversity lead to more parties. Accordingly, most studies examining the impact of social cleavages on party systems have found that measures of social diversity are associated with more fragmented party systems (e.g. Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Singer and Stephenson 2009 ).
Although few cross-national studies have examined the impact of religion per se on party system fragmentation, 1 some previous research suggests that religious diversity may be positively associated with party system fragmentation in the same way as other measures of social diversity are. Not only have religious cleavages been important for the development of religious parties in many democracies in Western Europe (Kalyvas 1996; Caramani 2004; Ertman 2009 ), but religious cleavages have had important effects on the development of party systems in other countries as well (e.g. Evans 2006; Mainwaring and Scully 2003; McAllister 2007) . Because religious cleavages in several countries have produced and sustained religious parties that compete for religious voters' support, most research assumes that religious diversity should produce more fragmented party systems in the same way that other forms of social diversity have been shown to produce more fragmented party systems.
In contrast to the assumption that religious diversity produces more fragmented party systems, other research argues that religious diversity is negatively associated with the fragmentation of the party system (Raymond 2016) . This argument holds that religious 1 The majority of studies that do examine the impact of religion on party system fragmentation do so as part of composite measures of social diversity that effectively assume the effects of religion on party systems are similar to those of other measures of social diversity (e.g. Lijphart 1999; Stoll 2013) . diversity creates incentives for religious groups to cooperate politically. Building on the 'supply-side religiosity' literature regarding the competition of religious groups in a market for adherents (Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994) , this research argues that in more diverse contexts where competition is most intense, religious groups will cooperate to support parties representing their shared issue concerns in order to preserve resources that can be more effectively spent competing for religious adherents. Instead of dividing their support across multiple parties representing issues rooted in religious cleavages, religious voters will concentrate their support on the party with the best chance of implementing favorable policies-even if this means abandoning parties explicitly formed to represent religious voters in favor of a secular party willing to trade policy in exchange for religious voters' support. Due the incentives for political cooperation, this research argues that higher levels of religious diversity will be associated with lower levels of party system fragmentation.
Before this revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation can be considered further, however, further research examining the testable propositions underpinning the argument is needed. In particular, we should be able to observe that religious diversity actually induces political cooperation (i.e. a reduction in the number of religious parties) if the purported relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation is indeed genuine. As this revised perspective argues, a diversifying religious structure reduces the size-and therefore political influence-of each religious group. Because religious groups competing in a market for adherents have to think first and foremost about their ability to attract and maintain religious adherents (per the supply-side religiosity literature), religious groups in diverse contexts-where competition for adherents is greater, thus limiting the resources available to devote to politics-may be less likely to field their own religious parties than religious groups in less diverse contexts. perspective argues, then we should observe that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections.
To determine whether this revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system development and fragmentation has merit, this study examines the relationship between religious diversity and the number of religious parties in countries around the world. Using an original data set including all national-level legislative elections around the world between 2011 and 2016, I estimate this relationship after controlling for several alternative explanations of party development. If religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections, then we would have evidence to support the argument that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the fragmentation of the party system. If, however, religious diversity has no effect on the number of religious parties (or if it is positively associated with the number of parties), then we would need to reconsider the merits of the revisionist perspective.
Measuring Religious Parties
To test the argument that religious diversity reduces the number of religious parties, I
produced a data set collecting the number of religious parties competing in elections in territories around the world. Specifically, I examined all legislative elections (focusing on the lower house in bicameral legislatures) held in autonomous or semi-autonomous territories between 2011 and 2016. Because several countries held more than one election during this period, the resulting data set is comprised of country-elections (rather than countries as the units of analysis). I focus on country-elections during these years (and not earlier years) to ensure the quality of the data collection: while it would have been preferable to collect data for a longer time series, information about all parties competing in each election is hard to come by in some countries, even in some long-established democracies. By restricting the data collection to more recent years in which the information necessary to account for all significant religious parties contesting elections is available, I sacrifice quantity of data for the more important quality of reliable measurement. To operationalize the notion of 'religious parties' in a way that distinguishes religious parties (which are the focus of the arguments of the revisionist perspective regarding the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation in Raymond 2016) from other parties that merely speak to issues concerning religious voters (to which the revisionist perspective does not speak directly), the present study uses those features seen in
Ozzano to identify religious parties. To identify religious parties, I focus in particular on the most tangible aspects: their ideologies, organization, goals, and the social bases they target in their appeals to voters and related interest groups. Specifically, I defined a religious party as any party whose organizational or issue/ideological profile is defined explicitly by religion.
This definition serves to distinguish parties formed explicitly to represent religious groups, voters, and issues from non-religious parties that may represent issues of concern to religious voters but whose existence is not defined explicitly by religion.
Parties were classified as religious parties if they met any one of the following criteria. First, any party including a reference to the religion represented by the party in their name (e.g. 'Christian Democrat' parties) was treated as a religious party. was classified as a religious party organization.
Third, parties were designated as religious parties if they belong to a religious party family. I used three sources to identify whether parties belonged to a religious party family:
the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) , the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017) , and the Parties and Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck 2017) . If a party was recognized as belonging to a religious party family by any one of these three sources, I treated the party as a religious party organization.
As a final means of determining whether a party was a religious party or not, I
consulted parties' websites. Where such websites were available, I treated parties identifying the representation of religious issues and/or identities as fundamental to the organization and goals of the party-rather than merely a set of issues supported by the party-as religious party organizations. The former rationale explains why parties like the Slovak National Party in Slovakia (which identifies the protection of traditional Christian values as an essential component of the party's nationalistic mission) are treated as religious party organizations, while parties like the Republican Party in the United States (which is, formally, a secular party whose platform merely supports issues of concern to many religious voters but is not organized explicitly for the purpose of representing particular religious issues or identities) is not.
A final note regarding the criteria applied to pre-electoral coalitions is in order. I treated parties as separate religious party organizations only if their vote and/or seat totals were reported separately from their coalition partners in official election reports. Keeping a distinct identity within the coalition is important for a party to be recognized by potential supporters, and thus parties whose religious identities are subsumed under a broader coalition identity alongside non-religious parties were usually treated as non-religious parties. In exception to this rule, pre-electoral coalitions are treated as religious parties only if one of two criteria was met. First, if the coalition is led by a religious party, the coalition is treated as religious. Second, a coalition is treated as a religious party/coalition if the majority of its member parties would be treated as religious parties according to the criteria listed above. Kwoka 1981) , I count the number of religious parties finishing in the top ten positions in each election. Focusing on the number of parties finishing in the top ten positions is preferable to trying to count the total number of religious parties in each election because most countries do not publish results identifying every party in every election. In addition to the problem of finding the total number of parties competing in every election, finding reliable information needed to determine which parties qualify as religious parties and which do not-even during the recent period studied here-is much more difficult for parties finishing outside the top ten positions. Thus, to ensure the reliability of the coding of religious versus non-religious parties, I focus on counting the number of religious parties among the top-ten parties in each election. While there is a concern that focusing on the top ten parties might introduce an arbitrary cutoff point, counting the number of religious parties using other cutoff points yielded similar results. upper tier is greater than/equal to 50 percent. Drawing from Duverger (1963) , who noted that political parties face few barriers to entering the first round of two-round majority systems, we might also expect to see that the number of religious parties is greater in two-round majority systems than other electoral systems electing representatives in single-member districts (e.g. first-past-the-post). Countries using two-round majority systems are coded one 4 The data from Alesina et al. are reported as fractionalization scores ranging from 0 to 1. To transform these into effective numbers of religious groups, I use the following formula: 1/(1-F) where F refers to the fractionalization scores reported by Alesina et al. The data taken from the WCD are reported as the percentages belonging to the following groups: Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, those belonging to several East Asian religions (Shintoism, Taoism, Chinese Universalism), the non-religious (atheists, agnostics, and otherwise non-religious), and all other religions. Religious diversity using WCD data is transformed into an effective number of religious groups in the same way as the Pew measure. 5 While recent research casts doubt on the possibility that the effects of social diversity on party system fragmentation interact with the permissiveness of the electoral system (Ferree et al. 2017; Milazzo et al. 2018) , other research examining the fragmentation of vote/seat shares suggests that the effects of electoral systems and social diversity are conditional on the impact of each other variable (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006) . In keeping with recent literature, model fit tests showed that most models interacting religious diversity and district magnitude did not significantly improve model fit relative to the models presented here. 
Analysis
I estimate six models, one for each measure of religious diversity using Poisson regression. 8 Because several countries in the period under study conducted multiple elections, I cluster standard errors by country. Parameter estimates for each model predicting the number of religious parties finishing in the top-ten places are presented in Table 2 .
Table 2 about here
In keeping with the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation, all six coefficients for the variables measuring religious diversity are negatively signed-suggesting that religious diversity leads to fewer religious parties contesting elections. With the exception of the coefficient for the WCD measure of religious diversity in 1900, each of these coefficients is statistically different from zero. The fact that the coefficients in models 3-6 become progressively stronger and more precisely estimated as one moves from the earliest to the most recent year of measurement suggests the possibility that the number of religious parties fluctuates over time in response to changing levels of religious diversity-with increasing levels of religious diversity reducing the number of religious parties. As the measurement of religious diversity increases in temporal proximity to the measure of the number of religious parties, the estimated effect religious diversity strengthens, suggesting that the number of religious parties contesting elections may respond to changes in the diversity of the religious market. In any event, the fact that several measures of religious diversity are negatively associated with the number of religious parties demonstrates the robustness of this relationship.
The coefficients measuring the impact of religious diversity on the number of religious parties reach statistical significance despite the fact that several control variables are also significantly associated with the number of religious parties. For instance, the positive coefficients associated with the variable measuring district magnitude suggest that religious parties are more likely to form in countries using electoral systems that are more favorable to the formation of new parties-religious or secular. The negative coefficients associated with the variable measuring ethnic diversity suggest that religious parties are less likely to form in ethnically diverse countries than countries with more homogeneous populations.
Additionally, the positive coefficients associated with the variable measuring countries' levels of democracy suggest religious parties are more likely to form in democracies-and less likely to form in non-democracies. Even after controlling for these variables, however, the fact that religious diversity remains negatively and significantly associated with the number of religious parties in each model (save model 3) further demonstrates the robustness of this finding.
To see the substantive impact of religious diversity more clearly, Figure 2 presents the predicted number of religious parties contesting elections across the range of each measure of religious diversity. To generate these predicted values, I hold all control variables at their median values. The predicted values in Figure 2 demonstrate that the estimated number of religious parties decreases from roughly 1.5 religious parties in countries with the lowest levels of religious diversity to fewer than one religious party. In many cases, the estimated number of religious parties at the highest levels of religious diversity is statistically indistinguishable from zero-and in every case, the estimated values at high levels of religious diversity suggest the chances of even one religious party contesting elections are low. To put it another way, the results in Figure 2 suggest that while one or two religious parties with the potential to finish in the top-ten positions might contest elections in religiously homogeneous countries, religious parties are unlikely to contest elections in the most religiously diverse contexts.
Figure 2 about here
Thus, the results presented here support the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party systems. In keeping with the argument that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties by compelling religious groups to cooperate on issues of shared interest to maximize their political impact (while preserving scarce resources that can be spent on competition for adherents in the religious marketplace), religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties in all six models estimated here. The fact this relationship holds when using different measures of religious diversity and even after controlling for several alternative hypotheses demonstrates that this relationship is quite robust.
Conclusion
This study began by noting a recent controversy that has emerged in the literature regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation. Most research assumes that religious diversity-like other forms of social diversity-creates conditions for party systems to fragment, especially considering that religious cleavages have led to the formation of several parties representing these cleavages. In contrast to this perspective, however, other research (Raymond 2016) argues that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation across religious lines that puts downward pressure on party system fragmentation. Before considering this revisionist argument further, however, we would need to see evidence of the other testable implications underpinning the argument that religious diversity reduces party system fragmentation. Chiefly, we should observe that religious diversity limits the number of parties contesting elections to represent religious voters and their interests.
In line with the revisionist perspective, the analysis of the number of religious parties contesting elections performed here suggests that religious diversity is indeed negatively associated with the number of religious parties. Though several other variables are also associated with the number of religious parties, the fact remains that the negative association between religious diversity and the number of religious parties cannot be explained by these alternative hypotheses. In contrast to the expectation that diversity breeds discord which prevents political cooperation, these results support the conclusion reached in earlier research arguing that religious diversity promotes political cooperation which leads to a reduction in the number of religious parties.
Though the findings presented above support the revisionist perspective regarding the impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation, it remains to be seen whether the predictions of this revisionist argument regarding the voting behavior of religious groups are met. As religious diversity increases, this argument predicts that religious parties become less viable because religious groups begin cooperating politically in support of the same parties on the basis of shared interests. However, it remains to be seen whether the negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of votes across parties is due solely to a reduction in the number of parties, or whether religious diversity impacts the behavior of voters as well. To this end, additional research examining the voting behavior of individuals is needed to evaluate the revisionist perspective.
One other important area for future research regards the impact of religious diversity on the representation of religious issues. If the results above suggesting that religious parties are less likely to form in diverse contexts are correct, this raises questions about how-and to what extent-religious issues are represented by parties not explicitly formed around religious identities and issues. The results presented here raise questions about how much representation is given to the concerns of religious voters in religiously diverse societies without religious parties. One might expect that explicit discussion of religious issues may be less common in religiously diverse societies where religious groups cooperate to support parties not formed around religion than in countries featuring religious parties because nonreligious parties need to appeal to voters concerned with a broader range of concerns than those dealing with religion. It may be that religious leaders in diverse societies might need to accept freedom from state regulation of religion-instead of the ability to shape morality policies in favor of one's religious preferences-as the biggest reward for their support of parties not formed exclusively to represent religious issues. However, the degree to which morality issues become partisan issues in countries without religious parties-such as Australia-suggests the possibility that the presence of religious parties is not necessary for issues concerning religious voters to be represented in political debates (c.f. Hurka, Knill, and Rivière 2017). Thus, future research will also be needed to determine the consequences of religious diversity for the representation of religious issues. 
